JULIO ENRIQUE CHOY-ALVAREZ and ISABEL MATILDA SEBASTIAN- FUENTES v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO ENRIQUE CHOY-ALVAREZ and
ISABEL MATILDA SEBASTIAN-
FUENTES,
Petitioners,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71176
Agency Nos. A072-119-249
A072-403-636
ORDER
Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,* Chief
District Judge.
The prior memorandum disposition filed on December 15, 2017, is hereby
amended concurrent with the filing of the amended disposition today.
With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing. Judge Graber and Judge N.R. Smith have voted to deny the petition for
panel rehearing en banc, and Judge Rosenthal has so recommended.
The full court was advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no
FILED
FEB 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App.
P. 35.
The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are
DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed in
response to the amended disposition.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO ENRIQUE CHOY-ALVAREZ and
ISABEL MATILDA SEBASTIAN-
FUENTES,
Petitioners,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-71176
Agency Nos. A072-119-249
A072-403-636
AMENDED
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,** Chief
District Judge.
Julio Enrique Choy-Alvarez and Isabel Matilda Sebastian-Fuentes, husband
and wife, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
FILED
FEB 27 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge
for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We
deny the petition for review.
1. We lack jurisdiction to “review [the] determination of the Attorney General”
that Choy-Alvarez is barred from asylum because he “has engaged in a terrorist
activity.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) & (D), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1227(a)(4)(B).
However, we retain jurisdiction over legal questions relating to the scope and
meaning of the terrorism bar, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. See
Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2009).
To the extent we have jurisdiction, the evidence does not compel us to
conclude that the BIA erred in determining that Choy-Alvarez was ineligible for
asylum or withholding of removal, because he had engaged in terrorist activity.
See Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding
that we must uphold the agency’s determination unless “the evidence not only
supports, but compels the conclusion that the asylum decision was incorrect”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
adverse credibility finding with regard to Choy-Alvarez’s knowledge and
relationship with the Shining Path terrorist organization. Choy-Alvarez presented
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inconsistent testimony, for which the BIA found he was unable to provide a
reasonable explanation. Second, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Choy-Alvarez failed to meet his burden of proof of establishing
eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. Because Choy-Alvarez’s
relationship and activities with the Shining Path indicated that the terrorist bar may
apply, he had “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such
grounds do not apply.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). Choy-Alvarez was unable to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not provide material
support to the Shining Path.
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Choy-
Alvarez has not established that it is more likely than not he will be tortured in
Peru. Xiao Fei Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2011). Choy-Alvarez
has not presented any evidence that he would be tortured by or with the consent or
acquiescence of the Peruvian government. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Sebastian-Fuentes
failed to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under
CAT; thus, we are not compelled to conclude otherwise. See Lolong, 484 F.3d at
1178. The BIA determined that there was no evidence of an objective basis for
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Sebastian-Fuentes’s stated fear of future persecution if she returns to Peru.1 See id.
Although Sebastian-Fuentes’s credible testimony about the four incidents in Peru
satisfies the subjective component to establish a well-founded fear of future
persecution, her fears are not objectively reasonable; Sebastian-Fuentes failed to
present objective evidence to suggest an individualized risk of future persecution
existed. See id. Thus, Sebastian-Fuentes failed to demonstrate that she was
eligible for asylum. Accordingly, Sebastian-Fuentes is unable to meet the more
stringent standard for withholding of removal, see Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d
667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004), and she has not shown that she is more likely than not to
be tortured, see Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1 The IJ found that Sebastian-Fuentes failed to establish past persecution.
Sebastian does not challenge this finding. Thus, it is waived. See
Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).
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