In the Matter of: TERRENCE J. MATTHEWS v. Dennis Sallaz;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Matter of: TERRENCE J.
MATTHEWS,
Debtor.
------------------------------
TERRENCE J. MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DENNIS SALLAZ; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-35565
D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00040-EJL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Terrence J. Matthews appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Matthews’ adversary
proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a
district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same
standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision.
Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162,
1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly dismissed counts 1 and 2 of Matthews’
complaint because Matthews failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The bankruptcy court properly dismissed counts 3, 4, and 5 of Matthews’
complaint because the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir.
2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the relief sought “would require the

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district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus
void”). Contrary to Matthews’ contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his claims.
A dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.
2004), and thus should be without prejudice, Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377
F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm the bankruptcy court’s dismissal, but
remand to the bankruptcy court with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect
that the dismissal of claims 3, 4, and 5 is without prejudice.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to amend the judgment.

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