Stephen T. Ensign; Laura A. Ensign v. U.s. Bank, as Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN T. ENSIGN; LAURA A.
ENSIGN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
U.S. BANK, as Trustee,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-35198
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01609-HZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Chapter 7 debtors Stephen T. Ensign and Laura A. Ensign appeal pro se
from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order striking
their amended complaint and dismissing their adversary proceeding. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision on appeal from the bankruptcy court and apply the same standards of
review applied by the district court. In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869,
879 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not err by striking the Ensigns’ amended
complaint and dismissing the adversary proceeding sua sponte because the
amended complaint failed to cure the deficiencies in the complaint previously
dismissed by the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (authorizing bankruptcy courts to
take sua sponte action or make any determination “necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders”).
Contrary to the Ensigns’ contentions, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
to enter a final order. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 7008 and explaining that a litigant’s actions may suffice to establish consent;
“Congress intended to allow parties to consent by their actions to the authority of
bankruptcy courts to enter dispositive orders on any bankruptcy-related claim.”).
We reject as unsupported by the record the Ensigns’ contention that the
bankruptcy court gave them vague instructions as to amending their complaint.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1993)
(issues not supported by argument in pro se appellant’s opening brief are waived).

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The Ensigns’ requests for judicial notice, set forth in their opening and reply
briefs, and U.S. Bank’s motion to take judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 18), are
denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

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