William Leonard Pickard v. U.s. Department of Justice

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM LEONARD PICKARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-15945
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00185-CRB
ORDER
Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,* District Judge.
The memorandum disposition filed on December 13, 2017, is amended by
the memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this order, as follows:
On page 3 of the memorandum disposition, in the paragraph beginning
"Plaintiff argues that," delete everything in the paragraph except for the first
sentence. Replace the deleted text with the following:
Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct that exemption 7(D) may be
"waived," he is entitled only to exactly the same information that has
been publicly disclosed. Pickard v. DOJ, 653 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir.
2011). If, for instance, the DEA had in its possession a videotape of
Skinner’s trial testimony, Plaintiff might be entitled to that videotape.
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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But what Plaintiff seeks—records that may contain some of the same
information about which Skinner testified—is not exactly the same
information that was publicly disclosed, so FOIA exemption 7(D)
applies.
With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny Appellant’s petition for
panel rehearing. Judges Graber and Smith have voted to deny Appellant’s petition
for rehearing en banc, and Judge Zipps has so recommended.
The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no
judge of the court has requested a vote on it.
Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc is DENIED.
No further petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc may be filed.
2

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM LEONARD PICKARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-15945
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00185-CRB
AMENDED MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,** District Judge.
Plaintiff William L. Pickard filed this action under the Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, seeking records held by the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") pertaining to a confidential informant named
Gordon Todd Skinner.
FILED
FEB 22 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

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1. We review de novo whether, as the district court held, FOIA exemption
7(D) prohibited the release of Skinner’s name and the information that he had
divulged previously at trial.1 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. FDA, 836 F.3d 987, 990
(9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (en banc). We conclude that the exemption applies
and that the information was properly withheld.
The question for decision is whether Skinner spoke, at the time he spoke, on
the understanding that his communication to the government would remain
confidential. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (DOJ) v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993).
One way for a source to be confidential is for the government to give an express
assurance of confidentiality. Id. An express promise is essentially unassailable
and is easy to prove. Rosenfeld v. DOJ, 57 F.3d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, a
senior lawyer for the DEA swore in a declaration that the DEA gives express
assurances of confidentiality to its informants in Skinner’s position, and his written
agreement confirms that the assurance was given to him. The fact that the
government stated that it could not "guarantee" that Skinner’s identity would never
be divulged merely describes the reality that the future cannot be known, but does
1 On appeal, Plaintiff does not challenge the district court’s application of
exemption 7(E) to the request for Skinner’s identifying number. He therefore has
waived any challenge to that ruling. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th
Cir. 1999).
2

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not undermine the assurance of confidentiality at the time Skinner gave
information to the DEA.
Plaintiff argues that public disclosure of information avoids the exemption.
Even assuming that Plaintiff is correct that exemption 7(D) may be "waived," he is
entitled only to exactly the same information that has been publicly disclosed.
Pickard v. DOJ, 653 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2011). If, for instance, the DEA had
in its possession a videotape of Skinner’s trial testimony, Plaintiff might be entitled
to that videotape. But what Plaintiff seeks—records that may contain some of the
same information about which Skinner testified—is not exactly the same
information that was publicly disclosed, so FOIA exemption 7(D) applies.
2. The district court "consider[ed]" Plaintiff’s request for all additional
materials to have been "withdrawn." Plaintiff did not ask to withdraw his other
claims, so we view this ruling as, in essence, an involuntary dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a decision that we review for abuse of
discretion. Tillman v. Tillman, 825 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016). We conclude
that the district court abused its discretion. The mere failure to seek summary
judgment on all claims does not mean that a party abandons the remaining claims.
Rather, it means (in the absence of some other indicator of failure to prosecute)
simply that the party intends to go to trial on those claims because issues of fact
3

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remain. Indeed, the district court did not grant Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment regarding all categories of information, and Plaintiff specifically opposed
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment alleging remaining issues of fact.
Accordingly, we vacate the involuntary dismissal of these claims and remand for
further proceedings.
3. We review de novo the sufficiency of a Vaughn index.2 Hamdan v. DOJ,
797 F.3d 759, 769 (9th Cir. 2015). The most recent Vaughn index gave sufficient
detail. We therefore affirm on this issue.
4. The district court failed to make findings on segregability. But no such
findings were necessary as to the two categories of information that are at issue on
appeal, because Plaintiff is not legally entitled to any of the information. Thus
there is nothing to segregate.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and REMANDED. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.
2 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
4

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