Juan M. Bribiesca, M.d., C.c.p v. PROCOPIO, CORY, HARGREAVES, AND SAVITCH, LLP, a professional corporation;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN M. BRIBIESCA, M.D., C.C.P,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PROCOPIO, CORY, HARGREAVES,
AND SAVITCH, LLP, a professional
corporation; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-55098
D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01225-BEN-AGS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 15, 2017**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Juan M. Bribiesca, M.D., C.C.P, appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment in his action alleging federal claims arising from his state court
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
NOV 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341
F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Bribiesca’s action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Bribiesca’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a
prior state court judgment, in which he raises issues that are “inextricably
intertwined” with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 722, 782 (9th
Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy in the state court
proceeding was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision);
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries
arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought
“would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was
wrong and thus void”). Contrary to Bribiesca’s contention, the extrinsic fraud
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Bribiesca did
not allege facts showing that any adverse party prevented him from presenting his
claims in state court. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a
party from presenting his claim in state court).

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We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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