Arutyun Demirchyan v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARUTYUN DEMIRCHYAN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 06-73326
Agency No. A028-234-622
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 14, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
In conjunction with his petition for review of an order of removal, Arutyun
Demirchyan challenges the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
determining that he did not receive derivative citizenship through his mother. We
have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we affirm.
FILED
OCT 03 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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We review for clear error a district court’s factual findings, including its
ultimate conclusion about citizenship. Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 426
(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Our holding in Mondaca-Vega forecloses Demirchyan’s
argument that de novo review should apply to citizenship determinations.
It is undisputed that Demirchyan is not a citizen if he was born in 1976 and
that his petition for review fails if he is not a citizen. The district court did not
clearly err in determining that Demirchyan was born in 1976 rather than 1977 and
that he is therefore not a citizen. Both Demirchyan’s Registration for
Classification as Refugee and his Armenian birth certificate issued in 1988 reflect a
1976 birthdate.
Demirchyan argues that the district court improperly placed the burden of
proof on him to show that he was born in 1977. This argument is unpersuasive.
The district court correctly applied the burden-shifting framework articulated in
Ayala-Villanueva v. Holder, 572 F.3d 736, 737 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). Under that
framework, evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
alienage and shifts the burden to the petitioner to prove citizenship. Only after the
petitioner produces “substantial credible evidence” of citizenship is the
presumption rebutted and the burden returned to the government. Id. The district
court did not err in concluding that Demirchyan failed to advance substantial
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credible evidence of citizenship, because each of Demirchyan’s documents
showing a 1977 birthdate was deemed either inadmissible or unreliable.
Demirchyan challenges several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Albino-Loe, 747 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2014).
First, Demirchyan contends that the district court erred in excluding his 1997-
issued birth certificate. This argument is unavailing. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the witnesses offered to authenticate the birth
certificate were not credible and that Demirchyan had failed to authenticate the
document by other means. Second, Demirchyan argues that the district court erred
in failing to credit two revoked U.S. passports and various other documents. The
district court reasonably concluded that the documents were entitled to very little
weight because they were generated by self-reporting by Demirchyan after he had
a motive to establish that he was born in 1977. Finally, Demirchyan argues that
the district court erred in citing to his perjury convictions without conducting the
balancing required by Fed. R. of Evid. 609(b) for convictions that are more than
ten years old. To the extent this was error, it was harmless. See United States v.
Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the erroneous
admission of evidence warrants reversal only if such error more likely than not
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affected the outcome of the proceedings). The district court articulated additional
reasons for his credibility assessment, including Demirchyan’s “clear bias” and his
lack of personal knowledge.
Finally, Demirchyan argues that the district court misinterpreted our 2011
transfer order and erred in precluding various new witnesses from testifying on
remand. Although the district court construed our transfer order narrowly, its
interpretation of the order was not unreasonable.
PETITION DENIED.
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