C. Hugh Jonson v. Ted Chepolis, an individual doing business in Skagit County, Washington;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
C. HUGH JONSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TED CHEPOLIS, an individual doing
business in Skagit County, Washington; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-35923
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01220-RSM
MEMORANDUM*
C. HUGH JONSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TED CHEPOLIS, an individual doing
business in Skagit County, Washington,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
PHILLIP JENNINGS, an individual doing
business in King County, Washington; et al.,
Defendants.
No. 16-35965
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01220-RSM
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
FILED
AUG 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-35923
C. HUGH JONSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TED CHEPOLIS, an individual doing
business in Skagit County, Washington,
Defendant,
and
PHILLIP JENNINGS, an individual doing
business in King County, Washington; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 16-35978
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01220-RSM
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
C. Hugh Jonson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging violations of federal law. Defendants cross-appeal from the
district court’s order denying their motions for sanctions. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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3 16-35923
953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of res
judicata); Hiser v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (summary
judgment). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Johnson v.
Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant
Chepolis and properly dismissed Jonson’s claims against the remaining defendants
on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata because Jonson asserted the same claim
against the same defendants concerning the same subject matter in a prior
Washington State court action that was dismissed with prejudice. See Intri-Plex
Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (federal courts
look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment);
Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 254 P.3d 818, 821 (Wash. 2011) (en banc)
(setting forth elements of the doctrine of res judicata under Washington law);
Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356, 361 (Wash. 1986)
(en banc) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata . . . a claim decided in a prior action
cannot be raised in a subsequent action . . . . A claim includes all rights of the
[claimant] to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose,
without regard to whether the issues actually were raised or litigated.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).

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4 16-35923
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants’
motions for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because defendants
failed to establish grounds for sanctions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Christian v.
Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of
review and describing grounds for Rule 11 sanctions).
Defendants’ Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 motions for fees
(Docket Entry Nos. 11 and 13 in appeal No. 16-35923; Docket Entry Nos. 10 and
12 in appeal No. 16-35965; Docket Entry Nos. 8 and 10 in appeal No. 16-35978)
are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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