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14-55375•Martha Jo Peters v. Wells Fargo Bank, Na
14-55375Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApr 24, 2017
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARTHA JO PETERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-55375
D.C. No. 5:13-cv-01735-JGB-DTB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Martha Jo Peters appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her diversity action alleging state law claims arising out of foreclosure
proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Peters’ action because Peters failed to
allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See United States v.
FMC Corp., 531 F.3d 813, 820 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[U]nder Ninth Circuit precedent,
incidental third-party beneficiaries may not enforce consent decrees . . . .”); see
also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable
legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions (Docket Entry Nos. 18 and 21) are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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