Kevin Lamarr Andres v. MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at RJ Donovan;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KEVIN LAMARR ANDRES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARSHALL, Correctional Officer at RJ
Donovan; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-56057
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01733-DMS-
BGS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Kevin Lamarr Andres appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an unlawful strip
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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search and denial of due process.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (legal
rulings on exhaustion); Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008)
(dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record, Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1058-59, and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Andres’ strip search claim against
defendant Marshall because Andres failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
in a proper manner. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“Proper
exhaustion [of administrative remedies] demands compliance with an agency’s
deadlines and other critical procedural rules[.]”).
Dismissal of Andres’ due process claim against defendant Briggs alleging
improper processing of grievances was proper because Andres “lack[s] a separate
constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v.
Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Andres’ claim
against Briggs without granting leave to amend because amendment would be
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
1 We address Andres’ excessive force claim in a concurrently filed opinion.

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Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Andres’ motions to
appoint counsel because Andres did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard
of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We reject as without merit Andres’ contentions regarding discovery because
the record was sufficiently developed to resolve his claims.
Andres’ motions to take judicial notice (Docket Entry Nos. 16 and 17) are
granted.
Andres’ motion to amend and supplement claim (Docket Entry No. 16) is
denied.
Andres’ motions to appoint counsel (Docket Entry Nos. 16 and 20) are
denied.
Andres’ motion to withdraw (Docket Entry No. 21) is denied as moot.
Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED.

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