Premalal Ranasinghe v. Great West Casualty Company;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PREMALAL RANASINGHE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 15-15247
15-15780
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00564-ROS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Premalal Ranasinghe appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action alleging breach of
contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1060 (9th Cir.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 15-15247
2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ranasinghe
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ranasinghe and
defendant Great West entered into a binding contract. See Schade v. Diethrich,
760 P.2d 1050, 1058 (Ariz. 1988) (reasonable certainty of contractual terms is an
important factor in determining whether the parties intended to make a binding
offer and acceptance); Heywood v. Ziol, 372 P.2d 200, 203 (Ariz. 1962) (“It is
elementary that before there can be a binding contract there must be mutual
consent of the parties to the terms thereof.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ranasinghe’s
motion for relief from judgment because Ranasinghe failed to demonstrate any
basis for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d
1254, 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and grounds
for relief from judgment based on fraud).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to
defendant Great West after considering the relevant factors because its conclusions
were supported by the evidence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (permitting an
award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the successful party in a contested action
arising out of a contract); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694 P.2d 1181,

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1184-85 (Ariz. 1985) (setting forth standard of review and listing the factors for
determining whether to award fees).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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