Alma Rosa Navarrete-Prado v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALMA ROSA NAVARRETE-PRADO,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-73180
Agency No. A070-121-516
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 11, 2017**
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Alma Rosa Navarrete-Prado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her motion to reopen exclusion
proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 19 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for
review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarrete-Prado’s motion
as untimely, where the motion was filed more than 15 years after the applicable
regulatory deadline of September 30, 1996, and she did not establish any grounds
for equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“A
motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion, or on or before
September 30, 1996, whichever is later.”); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176,
1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling is applied in cases where despite all due
diligence, the party invoking equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information
bearing on the existence of the claim (citation omitted)). In addition, Navarrete-
Prado has not established grounds for equitable estoppel based on alleged IJ
misconduct. See Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1184 (equitable estoppel requires a
showing of affirmative misconduct—a “deliberate lie” or “pattern of false
promises”—by a government actor).
Navarrete-Prado’s contention that the agency erred in denying sua sponte
reopening for failure to demonstrate exceptional circumstances does not raise a
legal or constitutional error to invoke our jurisdiction. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840

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F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).
In light of these determinations, we do not reach Navarrete-Prado’s
remaining contentions regarding her underlying 1993 exclusion proceedings and
her eligibility for adjustment of status.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

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