Paul Bush v. Robert Lee Pommer; Sharon Pommer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL BUSH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT LEE POMMER; SHARON
POMMER,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-15019
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00323-JAT
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Paul Bush appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his
action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a property dispute. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott
Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 16-15019
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Bush’s trespass
claim because Bush failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
he had possession of the land at issue. See MacNeil v. Perkins, 324 P.2d 211, 216
(Ariz. 1958) (under Arizona law, “[a] trespasser is one who does an unlawful act or
a lawful act in an unlawful manner to the injury of the person or property of
another” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We do not consider whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on Bush’s remaining claims because Bush failed to raise them in his
opening brief. See Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1994) (matter
not specifically and distinctly argued in opening brief is waived on review).
Bush’s requests for oral argument and to strike defendants’ motion for
summary judgment from the record, set forth in his opening brief, are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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