SALMA AGHA-KHAN, M.D., AKA Salma H. Agha v. United States of America;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALMA AGHA-KHAN, M.D., AKA
Salma H. Agha,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-15164
D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00042-DAD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted March 8, 2017***
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Salma Agha-Khan, a.k.a. Salma H. Khan, appeals pro se from the district
court’s order dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising out
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** Error! Main Document Only.The parties consented to proceed before a
magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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of bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d
1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Agha-Khan’s claims against Jeffrey M.
Vetter, David J. Cooper, Barry Lee Goldner, Lisa A. Holder, Connie Parker, and
Klein Denatale Goldner Cooper Rosenlieb & Kimball, LLP, as barred by the
litigation privilege. See Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b); Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d
724, 741-42 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing California’s litigation privilege).
Dismissal of Agha-Khan’s claims against CitiMortgage Inc., CitiBank, NA,
RE/MAX Holdings, Inc., and RE/MAX LLC was proper because they are barred
by res judicata, as Agha-Khan raised, or could have raised, these claims in a prior
federal action in which there was a final judgment on the merits. See Stewart v.
U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the elements of
the doctrine of res judicata, and explaining that res judicata bars “any claims that
were raised or could have been raised” in a prior action).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Agha-Khan’s
complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See
Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth

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standard of review and explaining that denial of leave to amend is proper when
amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Agha-Khan’s
motions seeking disqualification of all judges of the Eastern District of California
and a transfer of the action to the Central District of California because Agha-Khan
failed to establish grounds for such relief. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d
1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
recusal); Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000)
(setting forth standard of review and grounds for a change of venue).
We reject as unsupported by the record Agha-Khan’s contentions concerning
the district court’s application of Rule 8(a) and the alleged bias and improper
conduct of the district court judge.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.

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