Humberto Medina-Cabrera v. JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HUMBERTO MEDINA-CABRERA,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 15-72058
Agency No. A089-707-876
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 8, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Humberto Medina-Cabrera, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of
removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for
FILED
MAR 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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substantial evidence the agency’s continuous physical presence determination,
Lopez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2004), and the
agency’s adverse credibility determination, Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1039 (9th Cir. 2010). We review de novo constitutional claims. Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in
part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding
because Medina-Cabrera’s testimony was internally inconsistent, unreliable, and
not supported by sufficient evidence. See Shrestha at 1039-1044 (detailing REAL
ID Act adverse credibility standards). Because Medina-Cabrera’s testimony was
not credible and he did not provide sufficient supporting documentation regarding
his departures from the United States during the statutory time period, substantial
evidence supports the agency’s determination that he did not meet his burden of
establishing continuous physical presence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A), (d).
Medina-Cabrera has not established that inadequate interpretation deprived
him of a fundamentally fair hearing. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“To establish a due process violation, a petitioner must show that
defects in translation prejudiced the outcome of the hearing.”).
15-72058 2

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To the extent Medina-Cabrera contends the agency should have exercised its
sua sponte authority to reopen his case, we lack jurisdiction to consider this
contention. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011);
cf. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).
We do not reach Medina-Cabrera’s remaining contentions related to his
supplemental hardship evidence. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th
Cir. 2010) (review is limited to the actual grounds relied upon by the BIA).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
15-72058 3

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