Trayvon C. Harbor v. K. DHILLON, Doctor

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRAYVON C. HARBOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K. DHILLON, Doctor,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-15710
D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01781-WBS-
EFB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Trayvon C. Harbor, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
FEB 28 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Harbor’s deliberate indifference claim
against Dr. Dhillon because Harbor’s allegations and the documents attached to the
operative complaint fail to show that Dr. Dhillon purposefully acted or failed to
respond to Harbor’s pain. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122-23 (9th
Cir. 2012) (deliberate indifference may be shown by “a purposeful act or failure to
respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and . . . harm caused by the
indifference”; negligence and a mere difference in medical opinion are insufficient
to establish deliberate indifference); see also id. at 1116 n.1 (exhibits attached to
complaint may be considered in determining whether dismissal was proper).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Harbor’s second
amended complaint without leave to amend because further amendment would be
futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court
may dismiss without leave where . . . amendment would be futile”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harbor’s motions
for sanctions because Harbor failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11. See
Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 757 F.3d 870, 872-73 (9th Cir. 2014)

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(setting forth the standard of review and requirements for sanctions under Rule 11).
We reject as without merit Harbor’s contention that the district court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and discriminated against Harbor.
We treat Harbor’s exhibits, filed on September 16, 2016, as a motion to
supplement the record, and deny the motion as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

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