Jennifer Marie Jones v. Town of Quartzsite;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JENNIFER MARIE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF QUARTZSITE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-16261
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02170-DJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Marie Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in her
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s grant
of judgment on the pleadings, Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 15-16261
637 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2011), and for an abuse of discretion the district
court’s denial of leave to amend, Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725
(9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings because Jones
failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject as
unsupported by the record Jones’ contention that the district court erred by failing
to construe her complaint liberally.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jones’ complaint
without leave to amend because further amendment would have been futile. See
Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998) (leave to
amend pleadings not required where “amendment would be an exercise in futility,”
or “where the amended complaint would also be subject to dismissal[]”).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’ motion to
amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Jones
did not establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for relief under Rule 59(e)).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.

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