Ray Medina v. B. MORRIS, Facility Captain at RJD;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAY MEDINA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
B. MORRIS, Facility Captain at RJD; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-55787
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00169-JAH-KSC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Ray Medina, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment and dismissal order in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging due process, deliberate indifference to safety, and retaliation claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Doe v. Abbott
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 26 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We may affirm on any ground supported
by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand.
To the extent that success on Medina’s due process claim stemming from his
2008 disciplinary hearing would necessarily imply the invalidity of his disciplinary
conviction, Medina’s claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)
because Medina failed to allege facts demonstrating that his disciplinary sentence
has been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (challenge
to loss of good-time credits not cognizable under § 1983). To the extent that
success on Medina’s due process claim would not necessarily imply the invalidity
of his disciplinary conviction, the district court properly dismissed this claim
because Medina failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was denied any
procedural protections that were due. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-
70 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary
proceedings). Because dismissals under Heck should be without prejudice, we
vacate the judgment to the extent that it dismissed a Heck-barred claim with
prejudice and remand for entry of dismissal without prejudice. See Trimble v. City
of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).

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To the extent that Medina’s due process claim was based on his 2007
placement in administrative segregation, dismissal was proper because Medina
failed to allege facts sufficient to show a due process violation. See Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (liberty interest arises only when a restraint
imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life”); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100-01
(9th Cir. 1986) (requirements for placement in administrative segregation),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Medina’s
deliberate indifference claim because Medina failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Medina’s
safety by placing Medina in a cell with inmate Dale. See Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d
1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth elements of a claim against prison
officials for failure-to-protect inmates from violence by other inmates).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants
Marrero, Morris, Cortez, Franco, Glover, Gonzales, and Payne on Medina’s
retaliation claim because Medina failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether these defendants acted with a retaliatory motive or whether there was

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an absence of a legitimate correctional goal. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262,
1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that
his protected conduct was the ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the
defendant’s conduct.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Pratt v.
Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of
pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct
of which he complains.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Brown
on Medina’s retaliation claim arising from searches, a rules violation report, and
placement in administrative segregation because Medina failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether Brown acted with a retaliatory motive or
lacked a legitimate correctional goal. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271; Pratt, 65
F.3d at 806.
However, summary judgment for Brown was improper on Medina’s claim
arising from an inmate attack. The district court considered whether Brown
retaliated against Medina based on Medina’s filing of a religious grievance, but
Medina also contends that Brown retaliated against him in response to a staff
complaint. Medina submitted evidence that Brown told him that if Medina filed a

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staff complaint “you will regret it,” and later told Medina, after Medina was
attacked by another inmate, “I told you to drop your appeal(s).” Accordingly,
Medina raised a genuine dispute of material fact regarding this retaliation claim
against Brown. See Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 (elements of retaliation claim).
Therefore, we remand for further proceedings on the claim that Brown retaliated
by arranging an inmate attack.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Medina’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Medina failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel). In light of
the remand, the district court should reevaluate whether counsel should be
appointed.
Medina’s requests for counsel on appeal and for the case to be remanded to
new judges, set forth in the opening brief, are denied.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, REVERSED in part, and
REMANDED.

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