David Estrada v. Gipson;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAVID ESTRADA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GIPSON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-17230
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-00919-LJO-DLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O'Neill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner David Estrada appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Estrada’s failure
to protect claim against defendants Espinosa, Gipson, Lambert, and Cavazos
because Estrada failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
these defendants were deliberately indifferent to a threat to Estrada’s safety. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (a prison official is deliberately
indifferent only if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate . . .
safety”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-8 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for
establishing supervisory liability).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Estrada’s
retaliation claim against defendants Espinosa and Gipson because Estrada failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendants’ actions did
not advance a legitimate correctional purpose. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d
559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of a retaliation claim in the
prison context).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, including Estrada’s reference to the district court’s discovery
orders. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider Estrada’s arguments regarding the district court’s

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screening order. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (matters
not properly raised before the district court are waived).
AFFIRMED.

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