Wendi Meer v. Dennis Dillon Auto Park & Truck Center, Inc.;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WENDI MEER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DENNIS DILLON AUTO PARK &
TRUCK CENTER, INC.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-35681
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00025-BLW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Wendi Meer appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a vehicle lease
agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 23 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Munger v. City of Glaslow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). We
may affirm on any basis supported by the record. United States v. State of Wash.,
969 F.2d 752, 755 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Meer’s claims
regarding the repossession of her leased vehicle because Meer failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants breached the lease
agreement. See Idaho v. Shohone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095, 1098-00 (9th
Cir. 2006) (applying Idaho contract law and concluding that “[c]ontract terms are
to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms of a contract are clear, the
intent of the parties must be ascertained from the contract itself.” (citation
omitted)).
Summary judgment was proper on Meer’s credit reporting claim against
Northwest Leasing and bank withdrawal claim against Dennis Dillion Auto Park &
Truck Center, Inc. because Meer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether the credit reports were fraudulent or whether her monthly lease
payment for April 2011 was improperly withdrawn from her bank account. See
Friedman v. Live Nation Merchandise, Inc., 833 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016)
(burdens of persuasion for summary judgment).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meer’s motion to
disqualify Chief Judge Winmill because Meer failed to show “extrajudicial bias or
prejudice.” Thomassen v. United States, 835 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1987)
(standard of review); see also United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54
(9th Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily, the alleged bias must stem from an extrajudicial
source. [J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.” (alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Meer’s request to convert her motion to disqualify Chief Judge Winmill
into a Writ of Mandamus, set forth in her opening brief, is denied. See Bauman v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977).
The district court properly denied Meer’s motion to transfer her action to
this court prior to the resolution of her claims before the district court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291; Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc., 780 F.2d 766, 768 (9th Cir.
1986) (standard of review).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendants’ request for fees and costs, set forth in their answering brief, is

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denied without prejudice to renewal in a properly filed bill of costs and attorney’s
fees motion.
AFFIRMED.

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