Archison Tebogo Lazarus v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARCHISON TEBOGO LAZARUS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General;
et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
No. 15-56555
D.C. No.
3:14-cv-01618-JAH-KSC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 14, 2016**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Archison Tebogo Lazarus appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his
FILED
DEC 20 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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detention without release on bond. Our jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Lazarus’ habeas
petition because his release from detention on April 14, 2016, rendered his habeas
petition moot. See Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (“For a
habeas petition to continue to present a live controversy after the petitioner’s
release . . . there must be some remaining collateral consequence that may be
redressed by success on the petition.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Lazarus has not shown that he suffers any remaining legally cognizable collateral
consequences from his detention (including those imposed by the company that
paid his bond), id., or that there is a reasonable expectation that he would be
unlawfully detained by Respondents-Appellees in the future, see Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 L. Ed.2d 350 (1975) (“[I]n the
absence of a class action, the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ doctrine
[is] limited to the situation where two elements combined: (1) the challenged
action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party would be subjected to the same action again.”).
15-56555 2

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Lazarus contends that this court should resolve his claim of being a United
States national because, until the claim of nationality is resolved, the propriety of
his ongoing removal proceedings are in doubt. He also challenges an immigration
judge’s denial of his motion for return of documents in his ongoing removal
proceedings. However, the proceeding before us is an appeal from the denial of a
habeas petition challenging his immigration detention; it is not a petition for
review from his removal proceedings. Because these claims relate to his ongoing
removal proceedings, as opposed to his detention, they are not properly before us
upon a petition for habeas corpus. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1210-12
(9th Cir. 2011) (the REAL ID ACT eliminated habeas review of challenges to
removal orders and, although aliens may continue to bring challenges to their
detention through a habeas petition, the court may not look to the “underlying
removal claim” because doing so would allow “every alien petitioning for review
of his removal order [to] also petition for habeas review,” which would undermine
the streamlined system Congress created); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)(9) (all
issues of law and fact “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
remove an alien . . . shall be available only in judicial review of a final order” upon
a petition for review).
DISMISSED.
15-56555 3

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