SURINDER PAUL, AKA Surinder Paul Singh v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SURINDER PAUL, AKA Surinder Paul
Singh,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 14-70671
Agency No. A079-248-868
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 16, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and KOZINSKI and FRIEDLAND, Circuit
Judges.
A motion to reopen a removal proceeding must ordinarily be filed within
ninety days of a final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). But there’s
FILED
DEC 01 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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no time limit if the motion to reopen is based on material evidence relating to
changed country conditions that was unavailable earlier in the proceeding. See id.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). To successfully reopen a proceeding, a petitioner must show
that this new evidence is “qualitatively different” from what was previously
submitted. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Paul insists that country conditions in India have changed, but he offers no
qualitatively different evidence that this is so. Paul’s three new affidavits, all from
his family members, recapitulate what he had previously submitted. Paul’s new
country conditions evidence is similarly redundant. The Board of Immigration
Appeals did not abuse its discretion by denying Paul’s motion to reopen as
untimely.
DENIED.

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