Roosevelt Maurice Hogg v. COX, NDOC Director;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROOSEVELT MAURICE HOGG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COX, NDOC Director; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 15-16465
D.C. No. 3:15-cv-00158-RCJ-
WGC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 26, 2016**
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Roosevelt Maurice Hogg, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
and state law claims arising out of his classification as a sex offender. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
FILED
AUG 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes,
213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We reverse and remand.
Although the district court properly dismissed Hogg’s due process claim
because Hogg failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his classification as a sex
offender implicated a liberty interest and that he was denied procedural due process
protections prior to his classification, the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing Hogg’s complaint without a single opportunity to amend. See Lopez v.
Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that leave to amend should be granted if it appears at all possible
that a pro se plaintiff can correct the defect in the pleading); see also Neal v.
Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “the stigmatizing
consequences” of a sex offender classification “coupled with the subjection of the
targeted inmate to a mandatory treatment program whose successful completion is
a precondition for parole eligibility” is a liberty interest requiring procedural
protection and setting forth procedural due process requirements). Accordingly,
we reverse the judgment and remand to the district court to give Hogg an
opportunity to file an amended complaint.
All pending motions and requests are denied.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
15-16465 2

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