In re: STEVEN CARL GRONLUND; GINA MARIE GRONLUND v. KARL T. ANDERSON, Chapter 7 Trustee

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: STEVEN CARL GRONLUND;
GINA MARIE GRONLUND,
Debtors,
STEVEN CARL GRONLUND,
Appellant,
v.
KARL T. ANDERSON,
Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.
No. 14-60053
BAP No. 13-1566
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kirscher, Pappas, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted July 8, 2016**
Pasadena, California
FILED
JUL 22 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Before: CLIFTON, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and CHEN,*** District
Judge.
Debtor Steven Gronlund appeals from the decision of the BAP, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court order denying discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727(a)(2) and 727(a)(4)(A). We affirm.
We review the bankruptcy court’s judgment independently, without
deference to the BAP. Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th
Cir. 1998). We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo and its
findings of fact for clear error. Id.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), discharge can be denied when “the debtor,
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged
with custody of property under this title, has . . . concealed, or has permitted to
be . . . concealed” either “property of the debtor, within one year before the date of
filing of the petition,” § 727(a)(2)(A), or “property of the estate, after the date of
the filing of the petition,” § 727(a)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court did not clearly err
in finding that Gronlund concealed his interest in an asset related to Mexican
property both before and after filing his petition for bankruptcy and that he
possessed fraudulent intent in doing so.
*** The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
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Gronlund’s failure to specifically list the property interest in his schedules
and statement of financial affairs, as well as his failure to initially disclose the
existence of the asset during the 341(a) meeting amounted to acts of concealment.
The bankruptcy court was also entitled to infer that the concealment of the asset
was deliberate and fraudulent. The interest in the Mexican property was worth
several hundred thousand dollars and the income it provided made up a significant
portion of Gronlund’s monthly income. Although Gronlund contends that his
eventual disclosure of the asset’s existence to the Trustee during the 341(a)
meeting negates any finding of fraudulent intent, this argument ignores the fact that
he did not voluntarily bring the asset to creditors’ attention, but rather only
disclosed the asset in response to questioning regarding unexplained payments in
his statements and schedules.
Gronlund’s conduct after disclosing the asset further supports a finding of
fraudulent intent. Gronlund answered the Trustee’s questions about the asset
during the 341(a) meeting in an inconsistent and evasive manner. And even after
amending the schedules to include the asset, Gronlund stated that the asset was
overencumbered on account of liens that the bankruptcy court determined did not
actually exist.
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The bankruptcy court also did not clearly err in finding that Gronlund
“knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case[,] made a false oath
or account,” in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). The omission of the Mexican
property in the schedules and statement of financial affairs constituted a false oath.
Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A false
statement or an omission in the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules or statement of
financial affairs can constitute a false oath.”). The existence of the asset was also a
material fact, given its high monetary value. The bankruptcy court was justified in
finding that the omission of the asset was knowing and fraudulent for the same
reasons that it found the existence of fraudulent intent under § 727(a)(2).
AFFIRMED.
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