United States v. 2016-06-30 | 14-35039 | FREDRIC SANAI V. | nonprecedential | memorandum disposition |

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FREDRIC SANAI,
Plaintiff - Appellant.
No. 14-35039
D.C. No. 2:13-rd-00076-MJP
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 7, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: PAEZ, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Fredric Sanai seeks reversal of the district court’s imposition of
reciprocal discipline, following his unanimous disbarment by the Washington
Supreme Court. We affirm.
“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Final judgment was
FILED
JUN 30 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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entered in Sanai’s case on July 30, 2013. His notice of appeal was filed January
16, 2014. Moreover, Sanai’s Rule 59 motion, filed September 5, 2013, was filed
“later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b),(e). On
this basis, some of our precedent holds that the district court was “without
jurisdiction to consider” the untimely Rule 59 motion, Tillman v. Ass’n of
Apartment Owners of Ewa Apartments, 234 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000),
despite the district court’s attempt to toll “the 28-day filing period mandated by
FRCP 59(e) . . . for 9 days.”
Developments since Tillman suggest that the district court may have had the
ability to toll the deadline for filing a Rule 59 motion because Rule 59 is a court-
promulgated rule untethered to a statutory timeline. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at
210–11; Vaught v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp. Health Plan, 546 F.3d 620, 626
n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, because of the non-adversarial nature of this
appeal, we decline to consider whether our pre-Bowles precedents are still good
law. Ultimately, it makes no difference to the outcome of Sanai’s appeal: he loses
either because the district court lacked jurisdiction or because Rules 6(b)(2) and
Rule 59, working as “claims-processing rules,” Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210, denied the
2

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district court the discretion to entertain a late Rule 59 motion,1 Carter v. United
States, 973 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he district court has no discretion
to consider a late rule 59 [motion].”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court
must not extend the time to act under Rule[] [59(e)].”); Browder v. Director, Dep’t
of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 261 n.5 (1978) (“Rule 6(b) prohibits
enlargement of the time period prescribed in [Rule 59(e)].”).
The judgment is AFFIRMED.
1Moreover, even if we reached the merits of the Rule 59 motion, we would
affirm the district court.
3

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