RICARDO CABALLERO-GUAPILLA, AKA Miguel Angel Lopez Martinez, AKA Juan Jose Mendoza v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICARDO CABALLERO-GUAPILLA,
AKA Miguel Angel Lopez Martinez, AKA
Juan Jose Mendoza,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 14-71175
Agency No. A200-819-636
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Ricardo Caballero-Guapilla, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from
an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for cancellation of
FILED
JUN 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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removal and adjustment of status. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
We review de novo questions of law, Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-
92 (9th Cir. 2005), and we review for substantial evidence the agency’s continuous
physical presence determination, Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.
Caballero-Guapilla contends that his 2010 departure from the United States
should not render him ineligible for relief because he accepted voluntary departure
due to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Caballero-Guapilla has not
demonstrated a “gross miscarriage of justice” as required in order to collaterally
attack the final order issued in his previous immigration proceedings. See
Ramirez-Juarez v. INS, 633 F.2d 174, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the
agency did not err in determining Caballero-Guapilla was statutorily ineligible for
adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
and substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that he failed to
demonstrate the requisite continuous physical presence for cancellation of removal
due to his voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Vasquez-Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
14-71175 2

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