MANUEL NAVAR-DIAZ, AKA Manuel Diaz, AKA Manuel DeJesus Diaz, AKA Manuel Navardiaz,… v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANUEL NAVAR-DIAZ, AKA Manuel
Diaz, AKA Manuel DeJesus Diaz, AKA
Manuel Navardiaz, AKA Manuel DeJesus
Navardiaz, AKA Manuel Dejesus
Vavardiaz,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-72636
Agency No. A092-837-484
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 14, 2016**
Before: BEA, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Manuel Navar-Diaz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an
FILED
JUN 20 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We grant the petition for review and remand.
The agency determined that Navar-Diaz’s theft conviction under California
Penal Code § 487(a) was an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G) that rendered him removable. At the time it decided this case,
the agency did not have the benefit of this court’s decision in Lopez-Valencia v.
Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2015), concluding that “California’s theft
statute is both overbroad and indivisible . . . and a conviction under it can never be
a ‘theft offense’ as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).” Because Navar-Diaz is
no longer removable on this ground, we grant the petition for review, and remand.
In light of this disposition, we need not reach Navar-Diaz’s remaining
contentions regarding due process or his request for a continuance.
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.
13-72636 2

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