Lorene Foreman; Earnest A. Foreman v. Robert Freedman, an individual;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORENE FOREMAN; EARNEST A.
FOREMAN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ROBERT FREEDMAN, an individual; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-55124
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01187-MMA-
RBB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Lorene and Earnest A. Foreman appeal pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in their action alleging claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). We have
FILED
JUN 02 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We affirm.
Even assuming a cause of action could be alleged based on disability or
handicap, the district court properly granted summary judgment because the
Foremans failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether their
physical impairments qualify as disabilities under the ADA or handicaps under the
FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining disability under the ADA as a “physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more [of a person’s] major
life activities”); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (same definition for handicap under the
FHA); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d
1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set
forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory
allegations.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Foremans’ state law claims and dismissing them
without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc.,
715 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013) (once a district court dismisses the only
claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it does not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the remaining state law claims).
14-55124 2

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Foremans’
motions for appointment of counsel because the Foremans failed to demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir.
2009) (setting forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement
for appointment of counsel).
We reject as without merit the Foremans’ contention that defendants refused
to answer interrogatories.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
14-55124 3

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