Ronald Wesley Sims v. OFFICER K. LEE, No. 17046, official capacity;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD WESLEY SIMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
OFFICER K. LEE, No. 17046, official
capacity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-56820
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01548-DDP-
AJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 24, 2016**
Before: REINHARDT, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Wesley Sims appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims related to a
traffic stop. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
FILED
JUN 02 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, we deny Sims’
request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief.

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dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment
Sims’ claims against the State of California, the California Highway Patrol and
defendant Lee in his official capacity. See Krainski v. Nev. ex. rel. Bd. of Regents
of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010) (the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against the State, its agencies, and state officials sued in
their official capacities).
The district court properly dismissed Sims’ claims against Kruger Towing
Company and Lee in his individual capacity because Sims failed to allege facts
sufficient to state any plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse
its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sims’ state
law claims against these defendants. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 821, 826
(9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “[a] court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” (citation and
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internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing with prejudice
Sims’ claims against the United States after Sims failed to file an opposition to the
United States’ motion to dismiss, despite being admonished of the need to do so
and warned that failure to respond could result in dismissal. See Pagtalunan v.
Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review
for dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, and factors for determining
whether to dismiss for failure to comply with a court order or prosecute);
Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth
standard of review for dismissal for failure to prosecute).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sims’ motion for
default judgment against the United States because Sims failed to make a showing
justifying the entry of default judgment and the clerk never entered a default. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against the United
States . . . only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that
satisfies the court.”); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting
forth standard of review and explaining that Rule 55 requires first the entry of a
default and then entry of default judgment).
Sims waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to file a
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supplemental complaint because he failed to file timely objections to the magistrate
judge’s order. See Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.
1996) (“[A] party who fails to file timely objections to a magistrate judge’s
nondispositive order with the district judge to whom the case is assigned forfeits its
right to appellate review of that order.”).
We reject as without merit Sims’ contentions that the district court was
biased against him.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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