Dallas L. Cox v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DALLAS L. COX,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-15877
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01401-SRB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 11, 2016
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge and REINHARDT and CHRISTEN, Circuit
Judges.
Dallas L. Cox appeals from the Social Security Administration’s denial of
her application for supplemental security income benefits.1 The district court
granted summary judgment to the government, and Cox appealed. We have
FILED
MAY 04 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
1 The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not recount them here.

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the district court and remand for
an award of benefits.
Cox contends the ALJ committed legal error when he failed to incorporate
into his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, and corresponding
hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert (“VE”), portions of two
medical opinions to which he gave substantial weight. We agree that this was
error. “The hypothetical an ALJ poses to a vocational expert, which derives from
the RFC, ‘must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular
claimant.’” Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir.
2009). In determining the claimant’s limitations, “[t]he ALJ must consider all
medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.
2008); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). If, after consideration, the ALJ rejects an
examining physician’s opinion, he or she must give specific and legitimate reasons
for doing so. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1995). In assessing
the claimant’s RFC, an ALJ may not pick and choose evidence unfavorable to the
claimant while ignoring evidence favorable to the claimant. See Ghanim v. Colvin,
763 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014).
Here, examining doctors Bencomo and Finch opined that Cox retained some
ability to remember and perform simple tasks, but that her mental illnesses would
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make it difficult for her to get along with coworkers and supervisors, complete
tasks on a schedule, complete a workweek without interruptions from
psychologically-based symptoms, and take criticism. The ALJ gave significant
weight to each doctor’s opinion, but he incorporated into his RFC and hypothetical
to the VE only those parts of Dr. Bencomo’s and Dr. Finch’s opinions most
favorable to a finding of no-disability. The VE testified in response to the ALJ’s
primary hypothetical that someone with the stated RFC could work, and the ALJ
based his “finding of ‘not disabled’” on this testimony. The ALJ did not provide
any reasons—let alone specific and legitimate ones—for discounting any portions
of Dr. Bencomo’s and Dr. Finch’s opinions. This failure constituted legal error,
see Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 n.8 (ALJ likely erred by rejecting “certain favorable
opinions of the examining physicians” without providing “specific and legitimate
reasons” for doing so), and reversal is therefore warranted.
We likewise agree with Cox that remand for an award of benefits is
appropriate here. We accept the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Bencomo’s and Dr.
Finch’s opinions are due significant weight. The VE testified on cross examination
that someone with all of the mental limitations identified by Dr. Bencomo and Dr.
Finch would be unable to work. The VE’s testimony establishes that Cox is
disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587,
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595 (9th Cir. 2004) (remand for an award of benefits is appropriate when the
vocational expert testifies that someone with claimant’s precise limitations cannot
work). We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court with instructions to
remand to the ALJ for the calculation and award of benefits.
Because we deem this issue dispositive of Cox’s appeal, we do not reach the
remainder of Cox’s arguments.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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