United States of America v. Akhir Muhaimin Williams

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AKHIR MUHAIMIN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-50034
D.C. No. 2:01-cr-00297-ABC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 26, 2016**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Akhir Muhaimin Williams appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the 50-month term of supervised release and two special conditions
imposed upon his second revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
APR 29 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Williams argues that the district court procedurally erred in imposing the 50-
month term of supervised release and that the term is unreasonable. We disagree.
The record reflects that the district court considered Williams’s arguments and
adequately explained its determination that a 50-month term of supervised release
was necessary. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc). Moreover, the record reflects that the district court considered only
proper sentencing factors, including Williams’s repeated failure to comply with the
terms of release and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
Finally, the term of supervised release is substantively reasonable in light of the
sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Williams next challenges the special conditions of supervised release
requiring him to (1) participate in mental health treatment, as directed by
probation, and (2) submit to warrantless searches upon reasonable suspicion of
unlawful conduct. Contrary to Williams’s arguments, the district court’s reasons
for imposing each of these conditions are apparent from the record. See United
States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, because the
conditions are reasonably related to deterrence and the protection of the public, and

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do not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing them. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924. Lastly, the warrantless search condition does
not violate Williams’s Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Dupas, 419
F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2005).
We do not consider issues or arguments not raised and argued in the opening
brief. See United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100, 1105 n.9 (9th Cir.
2007).
AFFIRMED.

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