Christopher Rolland Poole v. AFFORDABLE COMPANIES LLC, The

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER ROLLAND POOLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AFFORDABLE COMPANIES LLC, The,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-57160
D.C. No. 8:13-cv-01734-UA-
DUTY
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 13, 2016**
Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Chistopher Rolland Poole appeals pro se from the district court’s order
denying his request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in his action alleging
federal retaliation and discrimination claims. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to proceed
FILED
APR 20 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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IFP, and review de novo a determination that a complaint lacks arguable substance
in law or fact. Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir.
1987). We vacate and remand.
The district court properly concluded that Poole’s complaint failed to state a
claim. See id. at 1370. However, the district court did not have the benefit of our
recent decision in Rodriguez v. Steck, 795 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2015) (order), which
explained that “a district court’s denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis is an
abuse of discretion unless the district court first provides a plaintiff leave to amend
the complaint or finds that amendment would be futile.” Here, the district court
did not address whether amendment of Poole’s complaint would be futile and did
not give Poole leave to amend. Moreover, it is not absolutely clear that the
deficiencies in Poole’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) discrimination
claim could not be cured by amendment. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245,
248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the
defect . . . , a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and
an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Accordingly, we
vacate and remand for the district court to redetermine Poole’s entitlement to IFP
after Poole files an amended complaint.
VACATED and REMANDED.
13-57160 2

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