United States of America v. Duke Nottingham

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DUKE NOTTINGHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-10357
D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00477-JAM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 12, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Duke Nottingham appeals the district court’s $15,860.59 restitution order on
remand. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
APR 14 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Nottingham contends that we should apply a presumption of vindictiveness
to the increase in restitution. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
the Supreme Court concluded that due process “requires that vindictiveness against
a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part
in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” Id. at 725. Because the “existence of
a retaliatory motivation would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in any
individual case,” the Court created a presumption of vindictiveness “whenever a
judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial,” and the
reasons for the enhancement do not “affirmatively appear” in the record. Id. at 725
& n.20; see Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2003).
The Supreme Court subsequently limited the applicability of Pearce. See
Nulph, 333 F.3d at 1057. The Court has clarified that a “presumption of
vindictiveness does not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a
higher sentence on retrial.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). Instead, the Pearce presumption applies
when “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is the product
of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Id. (citation
omitted). “Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon
the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness.” Id. at 799–800.
2

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Here, the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply.1 The district court
based its original restitution award of $7,500 per victim on the government’s
suggestion that such award was appropriate in light of other district court’s awards
and Nottingham’s contesting the charge at trial. In Nottingham’s prior appeal, we
rejected such calculations as arbitrary. Then, an intervening Supreme Court
decision2 clarified how to calculate such restitution awards. On remand, the
district court expressly applied the guidance from that intervening decision to
recalculate the award. Thus, the reasons for the slight increase in overall
restitution3 “affirmatively appear” in the record, see Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, and
there is no “reasonable likelihood” that the increase in restitution is the product of
actual vindictiveness, see Smith, 490 U.S. at 799. Due process does not require a
presumption of vindictiveness when a district court shifts from an arbitrary
restitution award to an award expressly based on intervening Supreme Court
precedent.
1 We assume without deciding that the Pearce presumption could apply to
increases in restitution after a successful appeal.
2 Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
3 For one victim, Vicky, the restitution award decreased; for another, L.S., it
increased. Such changes are entirely consistent with utilizing a new methodology
for calculating the restitution awards.
3

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Because the presumption does not apply, Nottingham must prove actual
vindictiveness. See id. at 799–800. He does not attempt to do so.
AFFIRMED.
4

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