Jeffrey S. Charney v. Carolyn W. Colvin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFFREY S. CHARNEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-55575
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-07080-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Jacqueline Chooljian, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 1, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey S. Charney appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his applications for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
FILED
APR 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) provided specific, clear, and
convincing reasons supporting the finding that Charney’s subjective symptom
testimony was not credible. First, the ALJ noted that no clear correlation existed
between Charney’s impairments and the date he ceased working in April 2010.
See Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988). The ALJ also noted
that, while Charney was diagnosed in April 2010 with a left knee medial meniscus
tear and carpal tunnel syndrome in his left arm, there was no evidence that he
subsequently was prescribed wrists braces, splints, knee braces, or other assistive
ambulation devices. The ALJ further noted that a clinical examination in 2011
showed that, although Charney was unable to fully make a fist, his range of motion
improved after multiple attempts, and that he tested negative for carpal tunnel
syndrome. The ALJ also noted that Charney reported problems with back pain in
2008, before he stopped working, and that subsequent neurological and imaging
tests in 2010 and 2011 were largely unremarkable.
Second, in finding Charney’s subjective pain testimony not credible, the
ALJ noted that minimal objective medical findings supported Charney’s
complaints, and no reports from any treating or examining medical sources
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corroborated Charney’s alleged degree of physical limitation. See Matthews v.
Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir.1993) (ALJ properly discounted the claimant's
allegations where no doctor “expressed the opinion that [the claimant] was totally
disabled” or “implied that [the claimant] was precluded from all work activity.”).
Third, the ALJ reasonably found that Charney’s conservative course of
treatment undermined his subjective complaints. Medical records indicate that
Charney’s treating physicians prescribed physical therapy, epidural injections, and
pain medication, but surgery was not recommended for his leg or back pain.
Contrary to Charney’s contention, the ALJ did take into account his fibromyalgia
and considered it a severe impairment. The ALJ found, however, no indication
that Charney had sought out any consistent medical treatment for his fibromyalgia.
A diagnosis of an impairment does not mean that the impairment is necessarily
disabling. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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