Marvalee J. Singleton v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARVALEE J. SINGLETON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-36119
D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00003-DLC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 7, 2016
Portland, Oregon
Before: BERZON and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SAMMARTINO,**
District Judge.
1. Substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s)
conclusion that Marvalee Singleton’s carpal tunnel syndrome was not a severe
FILED
MAR 25 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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impairment. Other than a single treatment note documenting Singleton’s
complaint of numbness and swelling, there is no evidence in the record that
Singleton’s ability to use her hands is limited in any way. See Carmickle v.
Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ thus permissibly
omitted the limitations stemming from Singleton’s alleged carpal tunnel syndrome
from his assessment of her residual functional capacity. See Bayliss v. Barnhart,
427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. However, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to
give little weight to Dr. Norum’s opinion regarding the severity of Singleton’s
limitations caused by her back impairments. As Singleton’s treating physician, Dr.
Norum was able to provide a “longitudinal picture” of Singleton’s condition and
offer a “unique perspective” that could not be obtained from other sources. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Ordinarily, the opinion of a treating physician is given
controlling weight by the ALJ unless it is unsupported by diagnostic evidence or
inconsistent with the record as a whole. Even then, the ALJ is required to take into
consideration multiple factors, including the length and extent of the treatment
relationship, when determining how much weight to give the opinion. See
Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202–03, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Here, the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Norum’s evaluation was unsupported
by diagnostic evidence. In addition to years of treatment notes, Dr. Norum
reviewed an MRI from May 24, 2010, which indicated that Singleton suffers from
multiple impairments, including advanced bilateral foraminal stenosis. The MRI
also indicated that Singleton’s condition had progressed since her last MRI. The
ALJ should have considered the fact that, in addition to having extensive first-hand
knowledge as Singleton’s treating physician, Dr. Norum also had the benefit of the
medical findings from the 2010 MRI that the reviewing physicians did not.
Because this error cannot be considered inconsequential, see Batson v.
Commissioner, 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004), we remand for additional
consideration of the weight to be given to Dr. Norum’s evaluation as compared to
the evaluations of the reviewing physicians. To the extent the ALJ found
inconsistences between Dr. Norum’s evaluation of Singleton’s physical limitations
and her evaluation of Singleton’s ability to perform daily living activities, the ALJ
should seek clarification from Dr. Norum. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,
459–60 (9th Cir. 2001).
3. On remand, the ALJ should also reevaluate the finding that Singleton’s
testimony regarding her symptoms and limitations was not fully credible. The ALJ
erred to the extent that he relied on the fact that Singleton could complete tasks of

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limited duration—such as grocery shopping, making the bed, and folding
clothes—as evidence that Singleton’s impairments were not as severe as she
claimed. These activities were not inconsistent with Singleton’s testimony
regarding her standing, sitting, walking, and postural limitations in a workplace
setting. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2001).
Additionally, the ALJ should reconsider the weight to be given the lay testimony
regarding Singleton’s limitations. The ALJ appeared to discount that testimony as
“incompetent” simply because the individuals had no medical training, but that of
course will always be true of lay testimony. And given our conclusions above, the
ALJ should reevaluate whether the lay testimony was actually inconsistent with the
available medical evidence, particularly the 2010 MRI.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.
Costs are awarded to the Plaintiff - Appellant.

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