Enrique Diaz v. J. Stevenson;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ENRIQUE DIAZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
J. STEVENSON; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 15-15409
D.C. No. 5:13-cv-04575-BLF
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Enrique Diaz appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process violations
arising out of his disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Dworkin v.
FILED
MAR 24 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). We may affirm on
any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59
(9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Diaz’s due process claim because Diaz
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the disciplinary board’s findings were
not supported by some evidence. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports the
disciplinary decision); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974) (setting
forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings).
To the extent that Diaz alleged that he did not receive notice of the charge
prior to his placement in administrative segregation, dismissal was proper because
Diaz failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants failed to provide him
with proper notice of the charge against him. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
476 & n.8 (1983) (due process requirements for placement in administrative
segregation), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472 (1995).
We reject Diaz’s contentions that the district court erred in not providing
Rand notice because the district court may consider documents that the complaint
necessarily relies on without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for
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summary judgment where the authenticity of the documents are not contested. See
Lee v. County. of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).
AFFIRMED.
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