United States of America v. Elizabeth P. Corral, a.k.a. Elizabeth Corral

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ELIZABETH P. CORRAL, a.k.a. Elizabeth
Corral,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 15-50369
D.C. No. 3:12-cr-01430-WQH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 15, 2016**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Elizabeth P. Corral appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges
the 10-month custodial sentence and two special conditions of supervised release
imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
MAR 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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2 15-50369
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Corral contends that, although she was permitted to allocate before
sentencing, the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide her with an
opportunity to be heard prior to the court’s decision to revoke. Contrary to Corral’s
contention, the denial of the right of allocution is not error warranting automatic
reversal. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather,
we review for plain error, see United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir.
2008), and find none. In light of the district court’s rejection of Corral’s request for
a low-end custodial sentence and placement in a halfway house, she has not shown a
reasonable probability that, but for the alleged error, the district court would not
have revoked supervised release. See id. at 553-54.
Corral next contends that the custodial sentence is substantively
unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Corral’s
sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence at the
high-end of the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable in light of the 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including
Corral’s repeated breaches of the court’s trust. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; United
States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Finally, Corral challenges the special conditions of supervised release
requiring her to, as directed by probation, (1) reside in a residential reentry center
for up to 120 days pending placement in a long-term residential drug treatment
program, and (2) enter and complete a long-term residential drug treatment
program. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v.
Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of Corral’s history and
circumstances, the challenged conditions are reasonably related to rehabilitation
and do not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), (2); Daniels, 541 F.3d at 924 (“[W]e give considerable
deference to a district court’s determination of the appropriate supervised release
conditions.” (internal quotations omitted)).
AFFIRMED.

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