Geuka Adibisha Jackson v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA and HOLLAND

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEUKA ADIBISHA JACKSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA and HOLLAND,
Respondents - Appellees.
No. 14-55139
D.C. No. 5:13-cv-00234-MWF-
JCG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 7, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Geuka Jackson, a California state prisoner, appeals from the district court’s
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Jackson
challenges his convictions for possession of weapons and drugs. As the parties are
FILED
MAR 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), it was
not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to determine that the exclusion
of Gregory Robertson’s statements did not violate Jackson’s due process rights.
Under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the exclusion of hearsay
testimony, pursuant to state evidentiary rules, violates an individual’s due process
rights when the statements provide “considerable assurance of their reliability” and
are critical to the defense. Id. at 300-02.
Here, it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude
that Robertson’s statements—that all of the weapons and drugs at the Fir Avenue
residence belonged to Robertson—were not sufficiently trustworthy. Unlike in
Chambers, here, Robertson’s statements were not made spontaneously to a close
acquaintance. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300. Furthermore, Robertson’s
statements were not corroborated. There was no evidence confirming that
Robertson had, indeed, been arrested one day before Jackson was arrested at the
Fir Avenue residence for possession of weapons and drugs. Additionally,
Robertson’s statements were not specific enough to be reliable. Robertson
provided no information about the type of drugs or weapons that he allegedly
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owned. See Christian v. Frank, 595 F.3d 1076, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Chambers
where the “testimony at issue . . . was materially less trustworthy than the excluded
testimony in Chambers”).
The California Court of Appeal also reasonably concluded that Robertson’s
statements were not truly against his penal interest due to their vagueness. When
making the statements, Robertson did not “want to be specific” about the location
of the weapons or drugs. Moreover, the drugs and weapons for which Jackson was
convicted were found outside of the Fir Avenue residence, not inside as Robertson
indicated. This case is clearly distinguishable from Chambers, and therefore, the
California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme
Court law such that Jackson is entitled to relief.
AFFIRMED.
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