Catherine Fromson v. GEORGIA PACIFIC, LLC, a limited partnership

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CATHERINE FROMSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GEORGIA PACIFIC, LLC, a limited
partnership,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 14-15401
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01294-SC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Samuel Conti, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Catherine Fromson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of her former employer, Georgia Pacific, LLC. We reject Fromson’s
argument that the district court “erred by weighing the evidence on Fromson’s
FILED
MAR 21 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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gender and age discrimination claims and by failing to draw all inferences in the
light most favorable to her as the Plaintiff.” The district court properly addressed
whether Fromson provided the evidence necessary to defeat the employer’s motion
for summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas1 burden-shifting framework.
See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028–31 (9th Cir.
2006).
Assuming without deciding that Fromson established a prima facie case of
discrimination, we conclude that Georgia Pacific presented sufficient evidence of
its legitimate business reason for terminating Fromson’s position “to rebut the
presumption of discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254–55 (1981). Fromson did not “demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them unworthy of credence . . . and hence infer that the employer
did not act for the . . . non-discriminatory reasons.” Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous.
v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 642 F.3d 728, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Morgan v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).
1 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2

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Because Fromson’s retaliation claims are assessed under the same
framework, they too fail. See Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir.
2011). And because Fromson does not give any independent reasons to support
her wrongful termination tort claim, she also does not raise a triable issue of fact on
that claim.
AFFIRMED.
3

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