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13-17344•Tammy M. Elgersma v. Noridian Administrative Services, LLC
13-17344Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMar 1, 2016
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAMMY M. ELGERSMA,
Plaintiff-counter-defendant -
Appellant,
v.
NORIDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant-counter-claimant -
Appellee.
No. 13-17344
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01322-SLG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Tammy Elgersma appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in her employment action alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII. We have
FILED
MAR 01 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Guatay Christian
Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Elgersma
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Westendorf v. W. Coast
Contractors of Nev., Inc., 712 F.3d 417, 422 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth elements
of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, and explaining that the plaintiff
must show that protected conduct was a but-for cause of the adverse employment
action). Even if Elgersma had established a prima facie case, she failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Noridian’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were pretextual. See Munoz v.
Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[The] plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of showing defendant’s stated reasons to be merely pretextual, once
defendant has given legitimate, non-retaliatory grounds for its actions.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
13-17344 2
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We reject as without merit Elgersma’s contentions that the district court was
biased and conspired with defense counsel.
Elgersma’s requests for sanctions against defendant and defense counsel, set
forth in her briefs, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
13-17344 3
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