Vincent K. Evans v. Alliance Funding

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VINCENT K. EVANS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLIANCE FUNDING,
Defendant,
And
CALIFORNIA CONTRACTORS
LICENSE BOARD; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-55062
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03200-DSF-RZ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 24, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
FEB 26 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Vincent Evans appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of EMC Mortgage LLC, Bank of America, N.A., and JPMorgan
Chase & Co. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and the procedural
history, we will not recount them here.
Although a number of arguments were presented on appeal, the only issue is
whether Evans’s remaining claims were time-barred. The claims that remained
before summary judgment alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42
U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1982. The FHA has a two-
year limitations period. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). The FDCPA has a one-
year limitations period. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Sections 1981 and 1982 are
subject to a state’s limitations period for personal injury claims or to a four-year
“catch-all” limitations period for federal claims set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1658. See
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004). The California
period for personal injury claims is two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1.
Evans filed the present suit on April 30, 2010, more than six years after the
January 2004 foreclosure sale and more than ten years after the origination of the
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1999 loan at issue. The district court correctly concluded that all of Evans’s claims
are time-barred.
Evans made no argument for tolling before the district court. Not only does
he invoke the concept of tolling for the first time on appeal, he does not support his
claim with argument for why or how tolling principles should apply to this case.
Therefore, the argument is waived. See Alexopulos by Alexopulos v. Riles, 784
F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986) (tolling argument waived when raised for the first
time on appeal); Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (claims
unsupported by argument on appeal are waived).
We need not, and do not, reach any other argument asserted by the parties.
AFFIRMED.
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