JUAN CARLOS MANCILLA, AKA Juan Carlos Mancilla v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN CARLOS MANCILLA, AKA Juan
Carlos Mancilla,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70959
Agency No. A205-314-671
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted February 2, 2016
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Juan Carlos Mancilla petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
decision (1) denying his claims for withholding of removal and protection under
FILED
FEB 12 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)1 and (2) denying him the opportunity to
apply for cancellation of removal.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Mancilla failed
to establish that a protected ground will be at least one central reason for being
persecuted.2 Although the IJ rejected Mancilla’s social group claim based on then
existing law, the IJ nevertheless concluded that Mancilla failed to establish a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in that particular
social group. The incidents, on which Mancilla relies to establish a fear of future
persecution, occurred in the United States more than thirty years ago. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Mancilla failed to produce specific, objective
evidence that he will be persecuted if he returns to Mexico, noting that his fear is
objectively speculative. A reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find
that Mancilla demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Mancilla did not
establish relief under CAT. Although the BIA did not specifically address the
2011 State Department Report, the IJ did. The BIA agreed with and referenced the
1 The BIA found that Mancilla’s request for asylum was untimely. Mancilla
did not challenge this conclusion. Thus, this issue is waived. See
Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).
2 Mancilla did not challenge the conclusion that he did not suffer past
persecution. Thus, this issue is waived. See id.
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IJ’s decision. We therefore “examine the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral
decision.” Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). Nothing in the
record suggests that the BIA or IJ ignored evidence or failed to consider the
evidence contained in the report. Thus, the BIA’s conclusion that Mancilla did not
establish eligibility for CAT relief does not compel a contrary conclusion.
2. We have jurisdiction over Mancilla’s cancellation of removal claim.
Mancilla, a pro se petitioner, exhausted the issue of cancellation of removal in his
appeal by raising elements of cancellation of removal in his brief. See Ren v.
Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011). In any event, the BIA addressed the
issue of cancellation of removal, noting Mancilla’s failure to apply. The BIA
further noted that Mancilla did not dispute his ineligibility for cancellation of
removal in light of his criminal history. However, and most importantly, the law
regarding Mancilla’s eligibility for cancellation of removal (given his criminal
conviction) has changed since that time. Therefore, exhaustion on this issue is not
required. See Alcaraz v. INS, 384 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2004).
In light of the change in the law, the BIA did not properly consider whether
Mancilla’s conviction under California Health & Safety Code § 11550(a) qualified
as a conviction relating to a controlled substance. We therefore remand the matter
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back to the BIA to make this determination and to determine whether Mancilla
may qualify for cancellation of removal.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part;
REMANDED.
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