Sherrie M. Keys v. Pacific 701 Mariposa LLC;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHERRIE M. KEYS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PACIFIC 701 MARIPOSA LLC; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-55975
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05244-PA-AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 20, 2016**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Sherrie M. Keys appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her action alleging various federal and state law claims in connection with her
eviction from her apartment building. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v.
FILED
JAN 28 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We may affirm on any ground supported
by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Keys’s claims against defendants
Pacific 701 Mariposa LLC and John Safi because Keys failed to allege facts
sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir.
2014) (setting forth elements of a RICO claim).
Dismissal of Keys’s claims against defendants Raymond Zakari and Zakari
Law, Inc. (“Zakari Defendants”) was also proper because Keys failed to allege
facts sufficient to state any plausible claims. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678;
United Bhd. of Carpenters, 770 F.3d at 837; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in
its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Keys’s motion to
amend after providing Keys with an opportunity to amend and concluding that
further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would
be futile); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its
discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly broad.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S.
Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth elements of a § 1983
claim and describing instances in which a private actor’s conduct constitutes state
action).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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