Alexiz Hernandez v. R. Grounds

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALEXIZ HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
R. GROUNDS,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 14-16283
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-00648-JD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 7, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,***
Senior District Judge.
No clearly established law addresses whether Hernandez’s counsel rendered
FILED
JAN 11 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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constitutionally deficient performance by failing to properly advise him about his
good-time credits before he pled guilty. The Supreme Court has not determined
whether good-time credits are a direct or collateral consequence of a plea, although
the California Supreme Court considers them to be collateral. See People v.
Barella, 975 P.2d 37, 41 (Cal. 1999). Nor has the Court addressed whether “there
may be circumstances under which advice about a matter deemed collateral
violates the Sixth Amendment.” Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1108
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
366 (2010) (holding that the failure to advise a client of deportation consequences
of a plea may amount to deficient performance, without deciding whether
deportation is a direct or collateral consequence); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60
(1985) (declining to decide whether counsel’s incorrect advice about parole
eligibility amounted to ineffective assistance).
Without Supreme Court authority on point, the state court’s determination
that Hernandez’s counsel didn’t render ineffective assistance can’t be contrary to
or an “unreasonable” application of clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). Accordingly, Hernandez
isn’t entitled to habeas relief.

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AFFIRMED.

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