United States of America v. Luis Michael Molina

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS MICHAEL MOLINA,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-50276
D.C. No. 3:12-cr-04922-BEN-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 6, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Luis Molina appeals his conviction for attempting to
bring an alien into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii)
and (iii). We affirm.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
JAN 8 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Border Patrol stopped Molina as he was attempting to enter the United
States. Officers searched his car and found a recently-built, non-factory
compartment. Inside the compartment, officers discovered Maria Villasensor,
who was attempting to enter the United States illegally. At trial, Molina argued
that he was unaware of Villasensor’s presence in his car. The jury convicted
Molina of attempting to bring an alien into the United States for the purpose of
commercial advantage or private financial gain, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), and
attempting to bring an alien into the United States without presentation to an
appropriate immigration officer at a designated port of entry, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(2)(B)(iii). Molina timely appealed.
The district court did not err in admitting Villasensor’s testimony that she
was going to pay a smuggling fee to be brought into the United States. Federal
Rule of Evidence 602 explains that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of
the witness’s own testimony.” Villasensor’s testimony that she was going to pay a
fee to be smuggled into the United States was admissible under Rule 602 because
her earlier testimony that she had worked with another individual on the details of

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being smuggled into the United States established sufficient personal knowledge.1
The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in allowing statements
by the prosecutor in closing that Villasensor could have been seriously harmed if
Molina drove recklessly because of the jagged edges of the compartment near her
face, and that Villasensor could have died if Molina was driving for too long.
“Prosecutors can argue reasonable inferences based on the record, and have
considerable leeway to strike hard blows based on the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” United States v. Tucker, 641 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The challenged statements were reasonable
inferences drawn from a record that established, among other things: the
compartment had jagged metal edges near Villasensor’s face; her head was right
above the muffler, which could reach 600 degrees; Villasensor was having
difficulty breathing; and she could not get herself out of the compartment without
assistance. Nor did the district court err in permitting the prosecutor to argue that
Molina knew of the danger to Villasenor, because the prosecutor’s statements were
1 Because we find that the district court did not err in admitting Villasensor’s
testimony as to facts of which she had personal knowledge under Rule 602, we
need not consider Molina’s alternative argument that Villasensor’s testimony
constituted improper lay opinion testimony under Rule 701.

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couched in explicitly inferential terms and reasonably drawn from the record.
We review Molina’s additional challenges to the prosecutor’s arguments for
plain error because Molina did not object to the statements at trial. See United
States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). The district court did not plainly err
by allowing the prosecutor to argue during closing that nobody would be paid if
Villasensor did not reach the United States alive. Villasensor’s statements about
payment in the future tense combined with the lack of evidence that any money
had yet changed hands made this a fair inference. Nor did the district court
plainly err in allowing the prosecutor to argue that a person would need keys to
open the compartment in Molina’s car. This statement was supported by the
record (as well as common sense) given that the compartment had to be opened
from within the car.
AFFIRMED.

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