Michael J. Corbett v. Dr. Jeffrey Beard

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL J. CORBETT,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
DR. JEFFREY BEARD,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 14-15281
D.C. No. 4:12-cv-02070-PJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Michael Corbett, a California state court prisoner, appeals from the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
DEC 21 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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1. There are three components of a true Brady violation: (1) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or
impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the prosecution, either
willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the suppression must have been prejudicial,
which is satisfied when the evidence is material. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,
691 (2004); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Assuming (1) the
transcripts of Corbett’s calls with his daughters were favorable impeachment
evidence and (2) they were under the control of and suppressed by the prosecution,
it was not an unreasonable application of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
under AEDPA for the California Court of Appeal to hold that the call transcripts
were not material.
Evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The
transcripts of Corbett’s phone calls to his older daughter were not material. In the
calls, Corbett repeatedly expressed his concerns about his daughters “going up
against” him as witnesses for the prosecution. Given that context, the older
daughter’s interpretation of Corbett’s offer of $30,000 in land as an incentive to
refuse to testify was understandable. It was not unreasonable for the Court of
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Appeal to determine that the impeachment value of the transcripts of Corbett’s
calls to his older daughter was not material.
The transcripts of Corbett’s phone calls to his younger daughter were also
not material. It was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to determine that the
calls were not “materially different from what [the younger daughter] testified to at
trial.” The tone of the calls was combative, and given the context of the
conversation, it was reasonable for the younger daughter to think that Corbett was
“in effect, accusing her of being complicit in the victim’s molestation.” It was
therefore reasonable for the Court of Appeal to hold that the transcript provided
immaterial impeachment value.
2. To prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
a petitioner must establish: (1) that his counsel was deficient, meaning that counsel
fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness;” and (2) that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, meaning that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
688, 694 (1984). When analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under
AEDPA, we must be “doubly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190
(2011) (citation omitted).
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Corbett’s Strickland claim is based on his attorney’s failure to obtain the
transcripts of the calls. For the same reasons described above, Corbett’s attorney’s
failure to obtain these transcripts, even if it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, was not prejudicial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (explaining
that the test for prejudice “finds its roots in the test for materiality” in Brady).
Moreover, to the extent Corbett’s claim is based on his trial attorney’s
alleged substance abuse, his claim also fails. Corbett did not identify any specific
behaviors, other than those related to the call transcripts, that show his attorney’s
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Bonin v.
Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 838 (9th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
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