Deepak Kumar Mali v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEEPAK KUMAR MALI,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-70428
Agency No. A089-303-434
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 11, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Deepak Kumar Mali (“Mali”) petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming denial of his application for asylum and
FILED
DEC 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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withholding of removal.1 The immigration judge (“IJ”) determined Mali was not
credible because his representations concerning his anti-Maoist political activism
in Nepal could not be reconciled with his lack of knowledge about Nepalese
politics and the organizations to which he claimed to belong. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) subsequently affirmed on these grounds. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
I
To obtain reversal under the substantial evidence standard, a petitioner must
demonstrate “the evidence . . . was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find” in his favor. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84
(1992). Mali has not met this demanding standard.
Mali claimed that he was raised in a politically active family and had been
participating in political demonstrations supporting the anti-Maoist party as early
as 1990, yet he did not know his party achieved a majority in parliament for the
first time in 1991. Even more disturbingly, although Mali told the asylum officer
that he could vote in 1999 and that he even helped distribute pamphlets for the
party’s candidates that year, he could not remember the name of their local
1 Mali does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he is ineligible for
relief under the Convention Against Torture; thus, the claim is waived. See Husyev
v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008).
2

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candidate—and even named the opposition candidate as the one he supported.
The IJ also determined that Mali did not sufficiently explain his failure to list his
political membership on his visa application—a conclusion that Mali does not
challenge on appeal. The record amply supports the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination.
Mali argues that the BIA failed to provide him with a reasonable opportunity
to explain inconsistencies in his testimony. But unlike the cases cited by Mali,
there is no indication the IJ refused to consider his testimony or refused him an
opportunity to clarify his story. Moreover, even assuming that Mali testified
consistently concerning his altercations with Maoists, the Real ID Act specifically
instructs that the IJ may consider “any inaccuracies . . . without regard to whether
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim” when assessing credibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The BIA
determined that Mali’s lack of knowledge of the political organizations in which he
claimed membership and changing characterizations of his political activism were
sufficient to undermine his credibility. Mali has not shown any “extraordinary
circumstances” that would “justify overturning [that] adverse credibility
determination.” Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).
PETITION DENIED.
3

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