Vigen Samvelovich Manukyan v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VIGEN SAMVELOVICH MANUKYAN,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-71647
Agency No. A099-365-281
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and CHHABRIA, **
District Judge.
Petitioner Vigen Samvelovich Manukyan, a native of Armenia and citizen of
Russia, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order affirming the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Vince Chhabria, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
FILED
NOV 25 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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denial of Manukyan’s application for asylum.1 We review for substantial evidence
the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility
determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1039–1040 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision
while adding its own reasons, we review both decisions.” Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d
1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.
2000)). We deny the petition for review.
1. Even if Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 2015), applied to
Manukyan’s petition, and even if the agency did not follow the procedural
framework adopted in Matter of R-K-K- governing how IJs may rely on inter-
proceeding similarities when making credibility determinations, substantial
evidence supports the adverse credibility determination in this case. As the BIA
noted, the IJ identified other “specific and cogent reasons” supporting her adverse
credibility determination that were unrelated to the inter-proceeding similarities
between Manukyan and his brother Razmik’s asylum applications. Shrestha, 590
1 The agency also denied Manukyan’s applications for withholding of removal and
relief under the Convention Against Torture. Manukyan does not address either of
those claims in his opening brief so he has waived any challenges to those
determinations. Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996).

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F.3d at 1042.
For example, the IJ noted that Manukyan had offered inconsistent testimony
and documentary evidence about when he was allegedly attacked and beaten by a
group of skinheads. The IJ did not clearly err in considering and rejecting
Manukyan’s explanations for those inconsistencies. See Soto-Olarte v. Holder,
555 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009).
The IJ also relied on Manukyan’s evasive demeanor and his sudden
departure from the hearing when confronted with the inconsistencies between his
testimony and his documentary evidence. “[A]n IJ’s determination regarding
demeanor is given special deference . . . .” Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056
(9th Cir. 2010). The IJ was further entitled to give the psychiatrist’s letter
explaining that Manukyan suffered from PTSD, and that this could have explained
his behavior at the hearing, relatively little weight because the letter, which was
hearsay, did not describe how the diagnosis was reached. See Singh v. Holder, 753
F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2014).
It is true that the IJ clearly erred in some of her factual findings, including,
as the BIA noted, her conclusion that Manukyan had changed his testimony
regarding the date of the skinheads incident at the second hearing. But we cannot

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say, in light of the IJ’s and BIA’s reliance on the inconsistencies regarding the
skinheads incident and on Manukyan’s demeanor, that “any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude” that the adverse credibility determination was
incorrect. Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
2. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s determination that there
is no pattern or practice of persecution against Armenians in Russia. See Lolong v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
“[T]he record in [this] case does not compel the conclusion that there exists
a pattern or practice of persecution against” Armenians in Russia. Wakkary v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2009). The 2009 Department of State report
does note that “[r]eports by refugees, NGOs, and the Press suggest[] a pattern of
police beatings, arrests, and extortion of persons with dark skin or who appeared to
be of Caucasus . . . ethnicity.” However, we cannot say that “any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), that these
incidents rise to the level of a “pattern or practice of persecution” within the
meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(iii). See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th
Cir. 1994) (describing pattern or practice as “extreme” and “systematic[]

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persecut[ion]”). “[A]lthough it is clear that a certain portion of . . . individuals [of
Caucasus ethnicity] suffer treatment that rises to the level of persecution, the
record does not establish that the situation in [Russia] is similar to the patterns or
practices of persecution described in our prior case law” such that we are
compelled to conclude the agency’s determination was wrong. Wakkary, 558 F.3d
at 1061.
Petition DENIED.

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