United States of America v. Ulices Montiel

13-50609Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitNov 12, 2015

Full text

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ULICES MONTIEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50609
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-03044-LAB-1
Southern District of California,
San Diego
ORDER
Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Barring Further Petition
for Rehearing is GRANTED. Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing of
Amended Memorandum tendered November 5, 2015, is ordered filed.
The amended memorandum disposition filed November 3, 2015, is amended
by the second amended memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this
order, as follows:
On page 2, footnote 1, delete the last sentence: "If Hamilton is believed, he
never left Defendant’s side until the interrogating officers took over and, thus,
Defendant could not possibly have thought that Hamilton talked to his boss before
Defendant confessed."
FILED
NOV 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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With this amendment, Appellant’s Petition for Panel Rehearing of Amended
Memorandum is DENIED. No further petitions for panel rehearing or for
rehearing en banc shall be entertained.
2

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ULICES MONTIEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50609
D.C. No. 3:13-cr-03044-LAB-1
SECOND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 31, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: GRABER, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Ulices Montiel appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, for
transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). We affirm.
The sole question presented is whether Defendant’s confession was
voluntary. We review de novo the conclusion of voluntariness, United States v.
FILED
NOV 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), but review the district
court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error, United States v. Gamez, 301
F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). We owe special deference to the trial court’s
credibility determinations. United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir.
1998).
Here, the pivotal issue is whether Agent Hamilton induced Defendant to
confess by promising him that, if he provided information, he would not be
charged with a crime. During the drive from the border to El Centro, Defendant
asked Hamilton if he could avoid being charged with a crime if he gave
information; Hamilton replied that he would ask his boss.1 Defendant claimed that,
after they arrived at the station, Hamilton left him alone for ten minutes, while
parked in a secure area, after which Hamilton returned and asked Defendant,
"You’re ready to go home?" Hamilton denied that he ever left Defendant alone in
the car, denied asking that question, and denied making any promise to Defendant.
The district court believed Hamilton’s version of events, after asking several
follow-up questions and considering all the circumstances. We defer to the court’s
1 Defendant argues that, although Hamilton said that he would ask his boss,
he did not ask his boss, thereby making a false promise. But Defendant’s claim of
inducement rests on much more than the foregoing promise; the alleged promise on
which Defendant relied in his testimony at the district court was the one discussed
below, in text, which the district court permissibly disbelieved.
2

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assessment of credibility and see no clear error in the court’s resulting findings of
fact.
Given those findings, on de novo review we conclude that the confession
was voluntary. Indeed, apart from urging this court to reject Agent Hamilton’s
testimony, Defendant does not point to anything about the circumstances of the
interrogation or about his own personal characteristics that would have rendered
the confession involuntary.
AFFIRMED.
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