Jagtar Singh v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAGTAR SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 12-72584
Agency No. A079-287-634
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 20, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, MURGUIA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Jagtar Singh (“Singh”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen proceedings for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
We deny the petition.
FILED
NOV 10 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. Singh does not dispute that his motion to reopen was untimely. Instead, he
argues that he is excused from the ninety-day time limit. Singh does not, however,
allege evidence of “changed country conditions” that “is material and was not
available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
proceeding.”1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
2. Singh asserts that two individuals fraudulently prepared his asylum
application, and he now seeks to apply for asylum under the facts he alleged in a
previous asylum application that he filed in Canada. But this does not constitute
“changed country conditions.” First, the grounds for Singh’s motion relate only to
his personal circumstances, which do not provide a basis to excuse the ninety-day
deadline. See Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028, 1031-34 (9th Cir. 2008). Second,
the circumstances surrounding the filing of Singh’s initial asylum application are
facts that could have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. Indeed, the
main focus of the merits hearing was the very fraudulent conduct that Singh now
seeks to rely on in his motion to reopen. When given the opportunity by the IJ,
Singh could have abandoned his fraudulent application and proceeded under the
1 Contrary to Singh’s arguments, the same time restrictions apply regardless
of whether the motion to reopen seeks to revive a claim under the Immigration and
Nationality Act or under CAT. See Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir.
2014).
2

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facts alleged in his Canadian application. Instead, Singh stood by his fraudulent
application. In sum, Singh failed to demonstrate “changed country conditions” that
would excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen. No other exception to
the ninety-day time limit applies, and Singh did not argue that he was entitled to
equitable tolling. We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion
in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely.
3. Singh’s additional arguments are without merit.
DENIED.
3

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