CHRISTOPHER GIL-ORTIZ, AKA Christopher Alain Gil, AKA Joel Martinez-Acevedo v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER GIL-ORTIZ, AKA
Christopher Alain Gil, AKA Joel
Martinez-Acevedo,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-71667
Agency No. A200-963-394
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 14, 2015**
Before: SILVERMAN, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Christopher Gil-Ortiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of a continuance, and denying his
FILED
OCT 20 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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motion to remand based on a claim of ineffective assistance. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to
continue, Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008), and a
motion to remand, Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2005),
and review de novo constitutional claims and questions of law, Mohammed v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying
Gil-Ortiz’s motion for a continuance to seek post-conviction relief in state court,
where Gil-Ortiz failed to demonstrate good cause for a continuance. See Singh v.
Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n IJ ‘may grant a motion for
continuance for good cause shown.’” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 )). Gil-Ortiz
conceded removability, he was ineligible for the relief sought, and collateral
post-conviction relief remained a merely speculative possibility at the time of his
final hearing. See id. (“[T]he IJ [is] not required to grant a continuance based on . .
. speculations.”); see also Sandoval-Luna, 526 F.3d at 1247 (rejecting a challenge
to an IJ’s denial of a continuance where “no relief was then immediately
available”).
The agency applied the correct legal standard to Gil-Ortiz’s request for a
continuance where it invoked the applicable “good cause” legal standard and cited
13-71667 2

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pertinent legal authorities. See Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th
Cir. 2009) (concluding that “the IJ applied the correct legal standard” in a case
where “the IJ expressly cited and applied [relevant case law] in rendering its
decision, which is all our review requires”).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to remand where
Gil-Ortiz failed to establish prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793 (to prevail on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, petitioner must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance). Contrary to Gil-Ortiz’s assertions, the BIA did not rely on his
failure to comply with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), in
determining that he failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
13-71667 3

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